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How does the chief executive of a large complex 
organization maintain strategic momentum? This 
represents a great challenge when there are no 
obvious external threats, and no obvious reasons for 
having a concerted action. Floris Maljers, Charles 
Baden-Fuller and Frans van den Bosch explore the 
inherent tensions which exist between stability and 
change. Change is necessary to maintain success, 
but too much change is disastrous. The authors 
argue that there are several possible solutions to 
this paradox, including that of generating periods of 
intense activity followed by periods of comparative 
stability and incremental improvement. Using the 
introspection of one of the CEOs of Unilever, who 
held office from 1984 to 1994, the authors examine 
how these tensions were played out and resolved. 
Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd 
Introduction 
In this article we wish to examine the CEO's task of 
leading the large complex multinational organisation 
strategically. The basis for our analysis is a combination 
of introspection from one of the CEOs of Unilever and an 
appreciation of the contribution of past strategy research. 
Unilever is a company which employs more than 280,000 
people in more than 80 countries, and is high on 
Fortune's 500 list (see Exhibit 1). It has been fortunate in 
having a sustained record of profitability for more than a 
decade, reflecting a combination of good fortune and 
hard work from all its management and workforce. 
Our article touches on only one key issue, that of how to 
maintain momentum when there are no obvious crises 
and threats. As many others have pointed out, a clear 
internal crisis is an excellent rigger for action. The 
enemy need not be within, it can be without, and 
environmental change can be a powerful motivator. 
Hannibal ante Portas rnobilised the Romans two thousand 
years ago. More recently, the success of Asian com- 
panies has mobilised American and European industries. 
When an organisation is seriously lagging, the challenge 
is clear, it must move forward. There are possibilities of 
mobilisation from an external threat, even where there is 
no profits crisis. This has been most evident among firms 
which have experienced deregulation. In the UK, British 
Telecom, British Gas, and the water utilities, among 
others, have been undergoing major change in the face 
of real or threatened entry and new regulatory regimes. 
We are concerned with the different, and arguably more 
difficult, problem, that of maintaining success when there 
are no obvious threats, internally or externally. Cyert 
and March have argued that the successful organisation 
has both the financial and human resources to undertake 
the investments needed to maintain success; in their 
words, there is 'slack'. Slack resources, although elpful, 
are not sufficient. The spur for action must also be 
present, and it requires something special to enlist the 
support of many layers of management when there is no 
obvious crisis, no clear enemy, and no compelling reason 
why the company should change dramatically. Unilever 
has been lucky in being able to rise to such occasions, 
not just once, but repeatedly. 
In this article we examine the role of the chief executive 
(in our case three people) as leaders and stimulators of 
repeated changes. As Exhibit 1 shows, the changing 
membership of the CEO team has been evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary, especially when one appre- 
ciates the equality of the triumvirate. Yet, as we suggest 
below, the CEO team appears to have been a critical part 
of the change process. 
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Exhibit  1 
Sketch of Uni lever  
In 1995, net after tax, Unilever had a turnover of $49 billion, and a net profit of $2.3 billion before special items, giving a 
margin of nearly five per cent. It had four product divisions: three of which were in fast moving consumer goods-food, 
detergents, and personal care products. The fourth division was speciality chemicals. It employed 280,000 people, and 
had manufacturing operations in more than 80 countries. It was in the top 40 of the Fortune 500 by turnover and 
profitabil ity. 
It has an unusual governance structure. It does not use the continental system of a supervisory board, nor does it have a 
division of chairperson and chief executive. Rather it has several CEOs, usually three men. The table below shows how 
changes in the CEO structure have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. One CEO is chairman of the Dutch 
holding company, one is chairman of the British company, and there is usually a 'third man' who is equal to the other 
two. 
Year Chairman of Chairman of The 'third man' 
Unilever NV Unilever PIc 
1982 H.F. van den Hoven D. Orr K. Durham 
1983 H.F. van den Hoven K. Durham F.A. Maljers 
1984 F.A. Maljers K. Durham M. Angus 
1985 F.A. Maljers M. Angus J.P. Erbe 
1986 F.A. Maljers M. Angus J.P. Erbe 
1987 F.A. Maljers M. Angus J.P. Erbe 
1988 F.A. Maljers M. Angus J.P. Erbe 
1989 F.A. Maljers M. Angus R.W. Archer 
1990 F.A. Maljers M. Angus R.W. Archer 
1991 F.A. Maljers M. Angus M. Perry 
1992 F.A. Maljers M. Perry M. Tabaksblat 
1993 F.A. Maljers M. Perry M. Tabaksblat 
1994 F.A. Maljers/M. Tabaksblat M. Perry 
1995 M. Tabaksblat M. Perry N. Fitzgerald 
In any large organisation, the chief executive team has to 
be subtle yet firm in its use of power. Too many 
upheavals provoke chaos, too few may invite paralysis 
and decline. Getting the balance right is difficult and 
there are many ways to achieve this end. In Unilever, 
during the last decade or so, there have been periods of 
sharp upheaval followed by periods of comparative 
stability. During the upheavals, the strategy has been 
reassessed and a new direction forged. In the intervening 
years, the new strategy was bedded own by means of 
acquisitions and disposals, new investments, and the 
building of skills in people and ideas. The concept of 
oscillation is a key theme. 
We will try to illustrate these points in the following 
pages. However, we must first explain why we think the 
environment has been benign to Unilever as a whole in 
the last decade, and why it has been true that mobilising 
the corporate body has involved more careful 
preparation and effort. This is not to say that in 
particular business units there have been no dangers nor 
even crises. But a crisis in a small part of the overall 
corporation is not a crisis for the whole. 
Unilever and its Environment 
In the early 1980s, according to many, Unilever's 
performance was satisfactory, but rather unexciting. As a 
group, it formulated a strategy which had clear 
geographic ambitions maintaining its traditional, mostly 
European, base, and expanding mainly in the North 
American continent. The geographic strategy was 
evident in a major US acquisition made in 1978. The 
purchase of the National Starch and Chemicals Company 
did not just add a geographic dimension, it also added a 
new product group to Unilever's chemical's business. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the acquisition revealed 
that Unilever was less explicit about its product portfolio 
strategy. At that time, the portfolio was considerably 
more diverse than it is now. It included the United 
African Company, a trading company with a strong 
presence in West Africa, with a proud and profitable 
history. There were also large remnants of the vertical 
integration policies of the past such as carton making, 
printing and packaging, oil milling, advertising agencies, 
a market research group and a fast growing transport 
division. 
At this time there was a weak threat to the group; 
organisations which were not performing well could be 
taken over. The RJR-Nabisco deal proved this threat was 
real in the food industry a few years later. However, it 
would be hard to argue, even with the benefit of 
hindsight, hat this was a mobilising factor for change. In 
the early part of the 1980s, Unilever was profitable and 
cash rich. The concept of the conglomerate was still 
fashionable during this period. The messages of the 
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gurus of the day were that if you had good management, 
you could manage virtually anything and everything. 
Yet, despite the absence of threats, Unilever underwent a 
major change programme in 1984, which involved 
reshaping the enterprise's product portfolio to a slimmer, 
more focused core, and disposing of some 20 per cent of 
the company. 
In the late 1980s, the general environment was more 
turbulent and hostile. This hostility was muted for 
Unilever, where the core of foods and personal care 
products was not suffering the same kinds of 
competition as car manufacturing plants, chemicals or 
high technology companies. More significantly, because 
by this time the group as a whole had a more focused 
look, having concentrated its portfolio into four product 
divisions, and because it had sold many 'peripheral' but 
often profitable businesses, the threat of takeover was 
even weaker than before. Yet, in 1988 Unilever went 
about another major change, that of refocusing even 
more sharply its product portfolio following on from the 
efforts of 1984. 
In the early 1990s, the environment was different again. 
Here the turbulence was one equally balanced between 
opportunity and threat. The threat came from slow 
growth rates and changes in consumer spending patterns 
in the major domestic markets in Europe and North 
America. The opportunities were in the development of 
emerging markets in the former bloc of Eastern Europe, 
and the high rates of growth in the Asian arena. These 
opportunities uggested, but did not require, major 
adjustments. Once again, there was no obvious enemy, 
but even so Unilever took the opportunity to adjust its 
geographic strategy in 1992, and these changes are still 
being driven through. 
In conclusion, over the last ten years, Unilever has faced 
no obvious crisis, yet it has initiated at the group level 
three major change initiatives or waves of change. To 
outsiders, it has been trying to ride the waves of 
environmental change forces, attempting to shape its 
environment by choices of where and how to compete. 
Of course, it has not always been wholly successful in 
this unstated aim, but even the ability to attempt to do 
this differentiates it from many other organisations 
which have operated in a mainly reactive mode. 
These observations beg as many questions as they 
answer. For example, how did the strategy waves get 
formed and carried out? Was there any evidence of 
cumulative building between the waves? And, can we 
learn from the Unilever experience? It is to these issues 
we now turn.  
Mobilising the Organisation in 1983 
As said earlier, in the mid-seventies, the company had 
formulated a strategy which had clear geographical 
ambitions, mainly strengthening the position in North 
America, but much less explicit in stating the objectives 
for the product portfolio. The activities were grouped in 
product coordinations, which usually reported irectly to 
a member of the Parent Board. The absence of product 
priorities meant that the rate of growth of a group 
depended to a large extent on the energy and creativity 
of the responsible director and his team. Or, to put it 
another way, there was a large bottom-up element in the 
way in which the activities proliferated. For the sake of 
completeness, we add that growth was seen as a 
corporate necessity. 
What were the triggers which persuaded the CEO group 
that the strategy was inadequate, and that it would be 
necessary toadd a product dimension to the geography? 
One strong argument for a review was certainly that the 
peripheral groups, as we will call them for the sake of 
convenience, in many cases showed isappointing profit 
performance, usually well below the 'orthodox' Unilever 
core groups. In addition, there was generally an uneasy 
feeling at the top that the understanding of the 
periphery was rather limited. The amount of time and 
effort required to control and give guidance to these 
businesses was more than their size and complexity 
necessitated. Or, to put it differently, the Head Office 
costs which their existence generated, was seen as 
disproportional to their profit contribution. 
But these were not the only factors. There were also 
some triggers caused by capital requests. For example, 
one of the more successful parts of the transport group 
was a company called the Norfolk Line, which 
specialised in 'roll-on roll-off' transport between the 
UK and Continental Europe. In 1983, the management of 
this company felt it needed to invest a large sum in 
Chatham, England, to improve its facilities. The director 
responsible agreed, and the proposal was brought o the 
CEO group of three. In the discussion it became 
increasingly clear that there was no-one else in Unilever 
with sufficient expertise to evaluate the proposal of this 
subsidiary. In a group where large investment decisions 
are taken with great care and where a high degree of 
expertise ispresent in many fields, this created an uneasy 
feeling to the extent hat the question was raised: 'what 
are we doing in transport anyway?' Looking back, it was 
like throwing a crystal in under-cooled water, suddenly 
the doubts about many of the peripheral activities 
solidified, and that was the starting point for a complete 
review of Unilever's trategic position. In due course, 
this resulted in a complete reformulation f the Unilever 
strategy, adding a clear and well defined product 
dimension to the geographic objectives. This became 
known as the 'core' strategy because it identified four 
core product groups: foods, detergents, personal 
products and chemicals. 
How were these groups identified? The principle was 
that the top team wanted to concentrate onproducts and 
markets where Unilever had most expertise in 
technology, marketing, sales and customer service. Or, 
to put it in the words of the military strategist Clauswitz, 
the top decided to concentrate on those areas where the 
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company could set the rules, rather than those where it 
had to follow them. It is necessary to emphasise that at 
this time, in 1984, the product groups were selected in 
very broad terms only. Despite this obvious limitation, 
the move was seen to be a considerable improvement on 
Unilever's past, and it formed the start of later 
definitions of product priorities. It is also worth pointing 
out this idea of forming a core product strategy was 
rather under-developed among European companies. 
Now we all know that formulating strategy is easy; as 
the German military commander von Moltke observed 
in the war of 1870, everybody with common sense can 
do it. It is far more difficult to implement he new 
strategy, certainly in a company the size of Unilever. It 
was clear that the new strategy would have major 
consequences for those managers who were not working 
in the newly defined core groups. As was Unilever's 
tradition, the first step was to communicate the new 
strategy to as many members of the management as 
possible, and obtain their support. Because this was done 
with great care, it turned out to be less difficult than 
expected. It was helped by the fact that Unilever has 
always had a good communications system, which had a 
number of facets. For important corporate decisions, 
there was (and still is) a tradition that the top 100 to I20 
and twenty most senior people are involved. This takes 
the form of a meeting where proposals of the CEO are 
freely discussed in working groups and a plenary 
session. To the surprise of the CEO group, the special 
meeting to discuss the core-strategy ended in an 
overwhelming acceptance of the new concept. This 
demonstrated that many in the organisation were 
waiting for some change, or as put earlier, the water 
was really under-cooled, and that a large group of the 
top executives were all co-owners of the new strategy. 
Apart from ad hoc meetings, there was, and still is, a 
regular communication flow which starts at the top. 
Every year in March, the CEO team addresses a group of 
400 senior executives, mostly from the operating 
companies and explains the progress and plans of the 
corporation, emphasising the new elements. The senior 
managers who attend this event in turn have meetings in 
their units and give the same basic message, adapted to 
their audiences. In this way, the information cascades 
quickly from the top down to the required level. In 
addition, the company has a strong informal network of 
contacts between managers. In 1984, the acceptance of 
the new strategy was the more surprising as a number of 
aspects went against the corporate tradition. Selling 
companies which were part of Unilever had been done in 
the past, but only rarely. The same can be said for 
restructuring and cost cutting - it was certainly not 
unknown - but the examples were few and far between. 
The group which felt most threatened by change was 
probably older middle management. The most senior 
people realised the need for change, the younger people 
saw it generally as an opportunity. However, the new 
direction was usually, though certainly not unanimously, 
well received. In addition, to many of the company's 
employees it came as a shock. If one had joined Unilever, 
it was considered to be a lifelong tenure, almost like 
being a civil servant. Unilever was essentially a European 
company, and this sense of the employment contract 
was still quite common in Europe 10-15 years ago, in 
contrast o North America then and Europe now. 
At this point it is worth emphasising that there was at 
the time no financial corporate crisis, not even an 
indication that one might come. Top management were 
not aware of any immediate threat of an unfriendly 
takeover by a raider or financial wizard. The company 
was profitable, had ample cash and a triple A credit 
rating. Second, it was clear that Unilever had a 
considerable amount of underpefforming assets in the 
peripheral activities, probably one of the reasons for a 
relatively low rating in the stock market. When it started 
its disposal programme, it turned out that it could sell 
some of the non-core subsidiaries for very good prices, 
enabling investment in those areas Unilever knew well 
and where it could achieve high returns. 
Implementing the new strategy meant more than 
acquiring, disposing and restructuring. It also required 
a concerted effort to improve the quality of the 
marketing and sales functions. There was also a need 
to strengthen research and technology. Fortunately, the 
speed of innovation increased notably. Company 
structures became slimmer, and the number of layers in 
the organisation were reduced. In short, the new 
strategy brought not only a change in focus of the 
company in product terms, it was accompanied by a 
number of efforts to improve performance in practice. 
In evaluating the results of the strategy, we must be 
aware that the economy in the second half of the 
eighties grew, the business cycle was in a positive phase. 
However, even taking all this into account, the financial 
indicators used by the outside world improved very 
considerably. Not only did profitability and return on 
investment improve, but the stock exchange rating of 
Unilever compared to its peer group went up. Even more 
importantly, the company culture began to move, and 
viewed from the somewhat restrictive lens of one of the 
CEOs, the management became more enterprising, less 
risk averse and more creative. 
The Second Change and a Move to 
Greater Corporate Entrepreneurship in 
1988 
It took quite some time to implement the major elements 
of the 1983-4 strategy. To the outsider, it is notable that 
seeing the bedding down of the changes initiated in 
1984 was perceived to be important and that no 
comparable change programme was initiated until 1988. 
By 1988, after the completion of the larger disposals and 
the purchase of some sizeable and many smaller 
acquisitions, the CEO group were asking themselves 
again, 'is the present product portfolio as defined in 1984 
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sufficient to give the company the growth it wanted? 
Are we not missing out in major markets?' Or, to put it 
differently, having cut off so much in the past few years, 
'does the company need a new leg?' This led to a 
reappraisal of the strategic position, a second phase after 
the formulation of the core strategy. For this, the 
company used the code name Starfish, an animal which 
can grow a new leg after it has lost one. 
The groundwork of collecting information and formu- 
lating alternatives was undertaken by Unilever's own 
small corporate development s aff with the help of an 
outside consultant. It would be interesting to discuss the 
role of outsiders in formulating strategies, but this is 
outside the scope of this paper. We note here that the 
CEO's perspective is that Unilever has used outsiders 
more as extra pairs of hands than as generators of ideas. 
The conclusion of this phase II study was discussed in 
the Board and the outcome was, in hindsight, 
surprisingly simple. 
The consensus was that Unilever's four chosen areas 
offered more than enough opportunities for growth. The 
existing strategy was reconfirmed, but there were a few 
new elements. First, the phase II discussions emphasised 
the need to give new impetus to certain elements of the 
earlier change and disposal programme which had not 
always been implemented fully, notably where 
nationalistic reasons were felt to make speedy action 
undesirable. Secondly, a few small up-and-coming areas 
were identified, where Unilever would invest in a 
modest way to see whether it would be able to enter 
those fields. But other than that, the existing activities 
offered more than enough scope. 
At this point it may be interesting to summarise some of 
the differences between the Starfish approach and the 
1984 phase described earlier. The first phase was entirely 
an initiative of the CEO and was therefore basically top- 
down. The CEO group had identified the problem, had 
developed the basic concepts, and had proposed the new 
strategy to the Board. It had also presented it to the 
management in various meetings and taken a direct 
interest in the implementation. This went relatively far, 
certainly for a corporation as decentralised asUnilever. 
An important matter was the precise interpretation of 
the core concept where many emotional and rational 
aspects came together. In an organisation where 
consultation and consensus had always been, and still 
were, considered the basic manner in decision-making, 
the relatively large top-down element was not always 
easily accepted. In 1988 the traditional mixture of top- 
down and bottom-up was partly restored. The manage- 
ment groups in the centre, who have profit respon- 
sibility, were more fully involved in the process. They in 
turn consulted the major operating companies in the 
other countries. Or, to put it differently, top-down and 
bottom-up met somewhere halfway and this made 
involvement and communication easier. Having said 
that, however, the process still had a major top-down 
element by Unilever's normal standard. 
A second ifference was that this time there was a much 
more focused effort to combine a product strategy with 
a geographical strategy. The teams identified Latin 
America as a priority, notably Mexico and Brazil where 
Unilever was virtually absent. In addition, like everyone 
else, the teams pointed out the opportunities in East 
Asia, especially South East Asia. Unilever was fortunate 
to have some strong positions in a number of markets. In 
Europe, the review concluded that it could not expect 
much growth in the North, where markets were 
saturated for most - though certainly not all - of the 
products. However, the company were clearly under- 
represented in the Mediterranean. The Berlin Wall was 
still standing at the time and opportunities in Eastern 
Europe were considered limited. In all, what was 
achieved was a much more sophisticated strategic matrix 
than it had before. To give just one example, Unilever 
became more convinced that it had to expand its foods 
business more aggressively in developing countries, 
where it was clearly under-represented. 
A third difference was that the company began to realise 
that the four core areas were each composed of a number 
of sub-groups, and that some of these were more 
interesting for their future development than others. This 
not very revolutionary observation was hard to address. 
How far should one go in splitting a core group into 
components? On what level does it still make strategic 
sense and when would they reach the stage of empty 
definitions/ To give a practical example of what the 
teams did, take personal care products, which they had 
treated as one group but which they now split between 
mass market products, such as toothpaste and shampoo 
on the one hand and prestige products on the other. 
That required a clear view of the mechanism of the 
markets and the behaviour of the consumer and the 
retailer. Icecream was another area, where the impulse 
market needs outlet control and has different economics 
from the take-home product. In giving the examples, it
sounds easy, but this is an area in which the crux was in 
the detail. 
Communicating the outcome of the Starfish project 
throughout he company was much easier than the 
earlier exercise. Many managers had been involved in 
the preparations and there was a generally felt need to 
update the existing strategy. This was an interesting 
development in corporate culture compared to phase I. 
At least, from the CEO perspective, it seemed that 
strategic change had become an accepted part of 
corporate life and that the management welcomed 
strategic direction. 
Looking back, the implementation f the 1988 changes 
were generally in line with expectations. A major search 
for acquisition candidates in food companies in Latin 
America had good results and Unilever could strengthen 
its position in Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. 
Another core group where it increased its investments 
was detergents for industrial use, especially in Europe. 
However, the main success was in personal products, 
notably the prestige segment. Here, Unilever acquired 
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Elisabeth Arden, Calvin Klein Cosmetics, and some 
smaller companies. This made the company a major 
participant in a market where so far it was hardly 
represented. Would things have been different without 
such a review? This is perhaps hard to say, and certainly 
the CEO is likely to say that the results would not have 
been as good. 
Changes for a Greater Product Focus 
and a New Geographic Emphasis in 
1992 
This brings us to phase III of the strategic process of the 
last decade. It was initiated in 1991-92, about 4 years 
after the Starfish project. The work on phase III was 
started because many in the organisation, including the 
CEO group, perceived that the business environment 
had changed dramatically, and there was a need to 
review the strategic priority. New geopolitics, together 
with emerging innovations in production technology, 
including informatica, led to the conviction that a more 
explicit strategy for allocating scarce resources was 
required. This desire for change came from the plethora 
of opportunities, but it would be hard to call it a forced 
change. Many other large organisations saw the same 
environment, but did not react similarly. 
We can see the forces for change if we look at the 
consequences of some of the new economic groupings 
such as the expanded European Union, and to a lesser 
extent, NAFTA. Events had shown that existing 
production structures were in a number of cases ineffi- 
cient. For example, where in the past, every European 
country produced a full range of icecream products for 
the local market, the abolition of the last vestiges of the 
internal borders opened up interesting opportunities to 
improve conomies by reducing the number of locations 
and increasingly specialising the production lines in the 
remaining ones. This necessitated major investments in 
restructuring programmes, which required ahigh level of 
managerial involvement and financial commitment. It 
also meant hat gradually more central guidance became 
unavoidable. This was an important cultural change in an 
organisation where decentralisation had been a 
traditional basic organising principle. 
A unique historical event, the fall of Marxism and the 
(partial) acceptance of a free market economy created a
second set of opportunities. The opening up of the 
markets in Central and Eastern Europe led to an almost 
gold-rush struggle, when all the major international 
players tried to enter countries uch as Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic. Similarly, the markets of the CIS 
countries could not be ignored. In addition there were 
opportunities in China, where the possibility of estab- 
lishing Western brands and quality standards tempted 
many consumer-goods companies to invest. In all these 
cases, investment decisions were, to an unusual degree, 
based on intuition, because the absence of reliable 
information made a scientific approach impossible. 
In the light of all this, it was clear that the company had 
to establish priorities, notably in allocating scarce 
management. It was also obvious that many decisions 
had a considerable 'top-down' element, because it was 
impossible to have all products introduced in every new 
market, or to undertake all restructuring at the same 
time. The CEO team therefore set out and agreed 
strategic priorities with the full Board and took upon 
itself to monitor the implementation with more than 
normal care. 
While changes in the environment led to a new approach 
to geographical decision-making, the product strategies 
were also reviewed. This meant further important 
refinement of the work done in phase II. Let us illustrate 
this with an example. In the past, beverages had been 
identified as one of the groups which should be 
emphasised within the foods division. On the basis of 
a further analysis, it was decided that the company 
should further concentrate on tea where it was already 
world leader. Given its competitive structure, the coffee 
market was not seen as a priority because the nature and 
power of Unilever's competitors made the opportunities 
less attractive and the risks seemingly greater. In 
contrast, within tea, it was felt that large opportunities 
existed, notably in promoting tea as a cold drink. This 
was a successful product in the US which had been 
recently introduced into Europe. This type of refinement 
of focus, based on an assessment of the available 
technology, and supported by a strong research and 
marketing programme was seen to be key to future 
Success .  
In short, although there was no crisis, nor any burning 
imperative, the entrepreneurial spirit of the organisation 
saw many new opportunities which made phase III easily 
implemented. 
Conclusions 
It has become fashionable to suggest that organisations 
should be in a constant state of change. In our view, this 
is a fallacy. Successful change has to be anchored in 
stability, else it runs the danger of provoking chaos. In 
Gorbachev's Soviet Union, the simultaneous changes 
unleashed after the fall of the Berlin wall were 
tumultuous, and eventually uncontrolled and destructive. 
There were few anchor points which could be used to 
create stability. The upheavals have been so profound 
and complete that change has gone out of control. 
Arguably, many are worse off than they were under the 
Communists. Whilst this may have been necessary and 
inevitable in Russia after such a long period of 
Communist hinking, it is surely not a model for 
orchestrated change in a large Western firm. Inaction, 
however, is not possible. The readers of this journal do 
not need to be told that too much stability is dangerous. 
If organisations are to survive, they need to orchestrate 
change, else the world will overcome them, and they will 
be 'selected out'. 
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The three waves of change at Unilever have been 
remarkable, because they were energised from within, 
without an obvious external threat. The first wave, 
arguably, had been the consequence of the arrival of a 
new person in the CEO team, who had a new 
perspective. But in a large organisation, such a new 
perspective is not enough to trigger changes, there must 
be other factors which are favourable too. In our case, 
these were also apparent. The second and third waves of 
change were as remarkable, if not more remarkable than 
the first. They represented repeated, successful attempts 
to engineer upheaval in waves. The way that the 
organisation responded to these upheavals was typical. 
At the start the process was mainly top-down, but as 
time passed there was a greater sense of bottom-up (or 
more properly middle-up). In the eyes of the CEO, this 
suggests that over a decade the organisation was 
becoming significantly more entrepreneurial and recep- 
tive to new ideas. It also suggests the bridging of that 
difficult gap between different levels of management. For 
those who believe that corporate ntrepreneurship is a
valuable but hard-to-create asset, this case study should 
give hope. 
Implementation f strategy has had a deliberate element 
and an emergent one. On the deliberate side, there has 
been a significant use of acquisitions and disposals, and 
more recently the forming of alliances. Investments have 
also been planned and carried out. But to suggest that all 
was deliberate would be quite wrong. There was a large 
element of the unforeseen and 'emergent'. As in all 
companies, one never quite knows how things will turn 
out, and the unexpected often arose. Morever, within 
Unilever, the emergent was encouraged. There was a 
strong sense of change flowing down from the top in a 
cascading fashion, like water down the mountain stream, 
gathering pace and energy as it moves. 
Finally we note that the resolution of the paradox of 
change and stability can be achieved in many different 
ways. We have no evidence that the four-year cycles of 
change are the best, and it is certainly not the only 
mechanism. But we suggest that the idea may be 
valuable for others facing similar challenges. 
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